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Summary 
The work of climate scientists, demonstrating human-driven climate change, has not provoked the 
wide-spread and far-reaching changes to human behaviour necessary to avert potentially catastrophic 
environmental trajectories. It has not yet sufficiently been able to engage the individual and collective 
imagination. Drawing on Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) and Iris Murdoch (1919-1999) we 
can distinguish two modes under which the human imagination can operate: in Murdoch’s terms, 
these are ‘imagination’ and ‘fantasy’. To relate imaginatively is to be willing to allow one’s internal 
image of the world to be changed by what one encounters, while an outlook characterised by fantasy 
relates to the world as one would wish it were, rather than how it actually is. Fantasy, therefore, 
operates not only among those who deny climate change, but also among those who entertain the 
promise of a technological solution too optimistically. An imaginative outlook, in contrast, evaluates 
actions and patterns of behaviour in terms of their relation to a wider whole. This is necessary for 
providing the degree of agency required to step out of a cycle of ever accelerating production, which 
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is explored in terms of an analogy to a discussion of revenge and forgiveness by Hannah Arendt 
(1906-1975). Ultimately, the need to engage the imagination is an opportunity as well as a challenge. 
To live imaginatively is fulfilling, and that is precisely what the challenges of climate change require.  
 
Main Text 
The STEM disciplines (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) rightly prize the quest for 
intellectual detachment and objectivity as part of their methods. Upon that rests much of their 
remarkable achievement in their respective domains. Among the recent findings of the natural 
sciences, little has greater bearing on the future of human wellbeing than work to measure and predict 
human-driven climate change and to discern its likely consequences, not least upon weather patterns, 
sea levels, the availability of drinkable water, crop and marine yields, human migration, and shifts in 
the prevalence of diseases. Engineers and technologists, for their part, are working on responses to 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and to sequester carbon dioxide. Some go further, proposing 
grander ‘geo-engineering’ interventions. In all of this, the commitment to intellectual detachment and 
objectivity is rightly valued, and yet, since a widespread response is called for in general human 
outlook and behaviour, the results of detached study need to translate into engaged action. The 
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findings of the sciences, and the proposals of engineers, need to enter into the human imagination, 
and that is the subject of this paper.  
A colossal shift is called for. Participants at the twenty-first session of the Conference of Parties of 
the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCC COP 21), meeting in Paris in November 
2015, forged a commitment hold ‘the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C 
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-
industrial levels’ [1]. They recognised that this will require a move to net zero emissions by 
sometime in the second half of the twenty-first century.
1
 Writing in 2011, Anderson and Bows 
calculated the necessary change as a reduction in emissions of the order of 4-5% per annum, 
aggregated across all nations, following a peak in 2025 [3]. That would call for a reduction among 
developed nations of as much as 6-10% per annum [4]. As Allwood and others have demonstrated, a 
full gamut of responses will be necessary, including far reaching changes in the use and demand for 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 ‘In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, Parties… undertake rapid 
reductions… so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals 
by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century’ [2]. 
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materials, rather than improvements to efficiency that nonetheless remain within current patterns of 
life [5]. 
 
Coleridge on Imagination and Fancy 
The human faculty of imagination has been a longstanding topic of philosophical fascination, not 
least because it stands at the intersection of perception, understanding and action, and for its capacity 
to relate past, present and future. To speak about imagination in that way, however, is already to 
identify it as something wider and more fundamental to human function than would be suggested by 
how we typically use the word today. In its contemporary, more restrictive sense, ‘imagination’ 
would belong to the domain of artistic creativity. On that view, a novelist would be ‘imaginative’ 
while she is writing her fiction but not, for instance, while she is driving her car. A sculptor would be 
imaginative in sculpting, but a member of the public would not necessarily be imaginative in viewing 
what he had made. 
In contrast, within the broader philosophical account discussed in this paper, imagination is not seen 
as the preserve only of those working in the creative arts. Rather, imagination would be integral to 
every act of perception or decision. From that perspective, any claim for a clear divide between 
creative and non-creative enterprises (as employed above), would be dubious. The philosophy of 
imagination presented here would stress, instead, that every act of perception or understanding, and 
the inception of every action, is a creative matter.  
Within English language writing, the pivotal figure for setting out such an account of imagination is 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834). Known as a writer of both poetry and prose, his ‘The Rime of 
the Ancient Mariner’ was published in 1798, as, with William Wordsworth, was the collection 
Lyrical Ballads. The Biographia Literaria of 1817 illustrates Coleridge’s standing as one of the 
principal early mediators of Kantian and Romantic German philosophical traditions into British 
writing, in a work that spans literary criticism and autobiographical exploration. 
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Precedent for Coleridge’s perspective on imagination is found in the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804),
2
 but the Englishman stands as more than simply a conduit for that Continental thinker. 
Coleridge’s contributions have remained a matter of fascination and inspiration to writers on the 
topic to this day.
3
 Not least, Coleridge proposed his own distinctive terminology, distinguishing 
between the ‘primary’ and the ‘secondary’ imagination. The classic, although undeniably dense, 
discussion of this pairing comes in the thirteenth chapter of his Biographia Literaria: 
The imagination then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary imagination I 
hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the 
finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary I consider as an 
echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary 
in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It 
dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is rendered 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 As discussed in footnote below. 
3
 In my own field, for instance, among contemporary philosophical theologians, particular attention 
to Coleridge on the imagination has been paid by John Milbank [6] and Douglas Hedley [7]. 
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impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, 
even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead [8]. 
By means of this distinction between the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ imagination, Coleridge was able 
not only to relate imagination to creative endeavours (closer to his secondary sense), but also to point 
to its role in all human perception, even calling imagination, in this ‘primary sense’, the ‘living power 
and prime agent of all human perception’. Coleridge made this all-pervasive function of imagination 
foundational, and labelled ‘secondary’ what we might more narrowly associate with artistic 
imagination. He acknowledged its importance, but saw it as grounded in something far more 
constitutive of the human mind, namely that ‘primary’ sense of the imagination.4 Important in both 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 Kant was an important influence here, although Coleridge adapted his scheme creatively and 
considerably. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, second edition 1787, known as the First 
Critique), Kant described imagination (Einbildungskraft) as ‘a faculty for representing an object even 
without its presence in intuition’ – which is to say, even while it is not currently directly apprehended 
[9]. He distinguished between imagination in a ‘reproductive’ (reproduktive Einbildungskraft) and a 
‘productive’ sense (produktive Einbildungskraft). The reproductive imagination is associated with the 
recall of what we have experienced but which no longer stands before us. As he put it in 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), this involves the ‘derivative presentation’ of 
an object ‘which brings back to the mind an empirical apprehension’ [10]. In this way, it is ‘merely 
recollective’. In contrast, the productive imagination is ‘inventive’, and is the wellspring of creative 
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senses is the human imaginative ability to see a gathered whole among, and out of, an otherwise 
overwhelming diversity of perceptions and possibilities. As J. Robert Barth put it, ‘we instinctively – 
even the least orderly or artistic of us – order our experience, creating meaningful wholes… We are, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
thought. It too, however, is grounded in prior experience, in that it obtains ‘the material for its images 
from the senses’, through prior experience [11]. All the same, while the productive imagination 
draws upon prior experience, what it produces is ‘original’ [12], in a way in which that which is 
presented by the reproductive imagination is not. Beyond such empirical or psychological 
considerations, Kant’s mature writing is centred around consideration of what might stand as the 
conditions for thought as such. Here (in this ‘transcendental’ register, in the first Critique), he again 
called upon imagination, as being able to bridge the gap between empirical sensation and the a priori 
categories and structures within which thought unfolds [13]. Significantly, Kant described this act of 
imagination, which undergirds the possibility of experiencing and understanding the world, as an 
exercise of productive imagination [14]. Finally, we should note the importance of imagination for 
Kant in the process of drawing together the ‘manifold’ aspects of the appearances of things into our 
unified ‘image’ of the whole [15] [16]. For a survey of Kant’s approach to the function of the 
imagination, see Samantha Matherne’s recent account [17]. With this sketch of Kant’s account of the 
imagination in place, we can see that Coleridge drew more upon Kant’s productive, rather than 
reproductive, imagination in writing about both his ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ senses of imagination. 
Beyond that, his ‘primary imagination’ seems function in a fashion analogous to Kant’s 
transcendental operation of the productive imagination. 
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all of us, shapers of our experience of what would otherwise appear a chaotic world around us’ [18]. 
Following from that, in the ‘secondary’ sense, ‘imagination allows the artist not only to perceive the 
world in an orderly way, but also to express that order in a new medium, be it paint or marble or, for 
the poet, words’ [19]. 
This account of imagination, drawn from Coleridge, provides the foundation for what follows in this 
paper. In particular, we will consider what it offers for understanding how human beings respond to 
scientific and technological conjectures in relation to climate change, and to material demand 
reduction more specifically. Crucially, while the above discussion of imagination has focussed on 
how this faculty animates perception, thought and action, this tradition also identifies an attenuated 
form of imagination, which can impede them. Here, again, Coleridge provides terminology that has 
been adopted, with a little modification, by subsequent thinkers. Immediately after the discussion of 
primary and secondary imagination quoted above, he turned to what he called fancy. His definition 
there provides relatively little precision. Fancy resembles imagination but it lacks the creativity of 
imagination at its fullest. In particular, Coleridge saw fancy as confined within the bounds of what 
one has had already encountered: within the ‘fixities and definites’ of the ‘ordinary memory’ from 
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which fancy ‘must receive all its materials ready made’.5 Fancy, for Coleridge, is an enervated form 
of imagination. It is a shuffling of the deck of memory, rather than something genuinely creative. 
Here, Coleridge acknowledges some of what previous philosophers had identified in imagination as a 
cause of distraction and error,
6
 but by giving it a separate name (‘fancy’), distinct from imagination, 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
 Capitalisation modernized. There is again a precursor to this discussion in Kant, who wrote about 
‘fancy’ in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View as ‘the power of imagination’ to produce 
images in an ‘involuntary’ fashion [20]. His contrast is between the choice involved in the 
imagination properly so called [21], and the wandering of fantasy, such that while we gladly play 
with the imagination, fantasy plays with us [22]. In this, he considered fancy to bear at least a trivial 
level of association with dishonesty and lying [23].  
6
 Perhaps surprisingly, Kant stands as an example. After having allocated such a significant place for 
imagination in his primarily epistemological First Critique, Kant significantly underplayed its 
significance in the more specifically ethical Second Critique (of ‘Practical Reason’, 1788) [24]. 
Bernard Freydberg notes that Kant, on several occasions, ‘choose to exclude or to denigrate 
imagination’s role in key sections of the Critique of Practical Reason’ [25], citing two passages in 
particular (V, 69 and V, 121). He interprets Kant’s motivation here as wishing to avoid 
misunderstanding. The passages involving imagination in the earlier Critique were some of those 
Kant considered to have been most significantly misunderstood. Because of that, he distanced 
himself from a comparatively expansive invocation of imagination in the later ethical work, both by 
means of those ‘denigrations’ and, more generally, by giving the subject of imagination ‘no textual 
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Coleridge was also able to emancipate what he took to be the positive senses and roles of imagination 
from previous criticisms. 
As a term, however, ‘fancy’ has an archaic ring to it and, in any case, what we might understand by 
this poor relation to the imagination requires further exploration. At this point, therefore, we can 
update our terminology, and expand our definitions, by turning to Iris Murdoch, who distinguished 
not between imagination and fancy, but between imagination and fantasy.
7
  
 
Murdoch on Imagination and Fantasy 
Like Coleridge, Murdoch (1919-1999) also spanned the worlds of philosophy and literature, as the 
author of more than twenty-five novels (starting with Under the Net, published in 1954) and several 
works of philosophy, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (1992) being her most extended work. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
prominence’. All the same, Freydberg argues, given the prominence of imagination in the first 
Critique, and in as much as the second Critique is part of the same intellectual project, the ethics of 
the second Critique must also rest upon an important role for the imagination. Not least, ‘Judgement 
must involve synthesis if it to effect either morality or experience of nature, so it must involved 
imagination; the Kantian philosophy requires this conclusion’ [26]. 
7
 Roger Scruton is another, a more recent, philosopher who has deployed a distinction between 
imagination and fantasy [27] [28].  
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Educated at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, she was fellow in philosophy at St Anne’s 
College, Oxford from 1948 until 1963. Also like Coleridge, and Kant before him, Murdoch located 
imagination in every act of perception. ‘The world which we confront is not just a world of “facts”’, 
she wrote, ‘but a world upon which our imagination has, at any given moment, already worked’ [29]. 
In saying this, she was not reducing our understanding of the world to mere fiction or projection. Her 
point is that we only understand the world in as much as it has entered into our apprehension: in as 
much as it has been taken up into our imagination, or overarching image of reality. In this way, and 
again like Coleridge, Murdoch did not see the exercise of imagination as an overlay that obscures the 
world, but as a matter of entering into reality, so that it may enter into us, as represented by internal 
images.  
Fundamental to Murdoch’s vision here is her contention that to know and act imaginatively is to be 
willing to turn towards the world, so as to receive from it. She saw this as far more demanding than 
we might immediately suppose. She recognised that the exercise of imagination, although ubiquitous, 
12 
 
 
 
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A.  
 
 
 
is not always so healthy and truth-seeking. Its ‘working’ can easily veer towards fantasy, which 
would then ‘constitute a barrier to our seeing “what is really there”’ [29].8 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
 A note is due on J. R. R. Tolkien’s strikingly different use of the word fantasy in his influential 
essay ‘On Fairy Stories’ [30], which is widely considered to be his theological prose masterpiece. It 
constitutes a defence of fantasy, and may therefore seem to be at odds with Murdoch (for instance), 
and an account of imagination as productive and fantasy as obscuring. This, however, turns out to be 
a distinction without a difference. For her part, Murdoch recognised the possibility of fluidity in 
labelling what she set out to praise and to warn against, and was willing, for instance, to describe 
fantasy as ‘bad imagining’ [31]. Tolkien, in turn, recognised that his positive use of the word fantasy 
was provocative: ‘Imagination has often been held to be something higher than the mere image-
making, ascribed to the operations of Fancy’ [32]. In order to reclaim ‘fantasy’ as a name for the 
positive power of imagination, or some aspects of it, Tolkien wrote that he may need ‘to arrogate to 
myself the powers of Humpty-Dumpty, and to use Fantasy for this purpose’ [33]. All the same, he 
favoured ‘fantasy’ because of the sense that it flagged ‘a quality of strangeness’ of a sort that could 
arrest our attention (on which, see Alison Milbank [34]). Having chosen this term, in his essay 
Tolkien discusses under the banner of ‘fantasy’ both what Murdoch claimed positively for the 
imagination (such as seeing things ‘apart from ourselves’ – as ‘freed from the drab blur of triteness 
and familiarity’ and ‘possessiveness’ [35]) and negatively for fantasy (in her sense): without attention 
to truth, Tolkien wrote, fantasy will ‘languish… [and even] perish, and become Morbid Delusion’ 
[36]. That is to say, fantasy in his sense can become fantasy in Murdoch’s. Etymologically, we might 
note, the English word ‘imagination’ derives from the Latin imaginatio and ‘fantasy’ from the Greek 
phantasía. In their original use in those languages, the two words are largely cognate, imaginatio 
being the natural Latin word with which to translate phantasía. 
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Imagination involves a disposition towards that which is other than us, and a certain honesty before 
it. In contrast, to operate according to a mode of fantasy is to be turned inwards.
9
 Human beings, 
Murdoch thought, are often ‘fabricating’ and are ‘usually self-preoccupied’. That subverts the proper 
operation of the imagination, tending instead towards the weaving of a ‘falsifying veil which partially 
conceals the world’ [41]. Instead of the humble curiosity about reality (characterised by ‘objectivity 
and realism’), associated with imagination, we can be occupied in ‘fantasies and reveries’. Which 
way one is disposed, one way or the other, is ‘profoundly connected with our energies and our ability 
to choose and act.’ 
The language of construction here – of ‘fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often 
falsifying veil’ – is significant. Like Coleridge, Murdoch saw all perception and thought as a 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
 One can see here a parallel with the persistent tradition among Christian theologians to describe the 
human flaw as a turning in upon oneself. The roots of the idea are in Augustine of Hippo [37] [38]. 
The classic description comes from Luther, who associated an evil inclination with the human heart 
as incurvatus in se: curled in upon itself [39]. The pagan neo-Platonist Plotinus, a significant 
influence on Augustine, had already diagnosed evil as springing from people ‘wishing to belong to 
themselves’ [40]. 
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profoundly active matter. The difference between its operation according to imagination and fantasy 
is the difference between something active in its imaginative embrace of reality, with an associated 
willingness to be challenge by it, and something active in the fabrication and veil-weaving of fantasy. 
That, in turn, makes a life of ‘dull fantasy’ therefore an enclosed one, of one’s own construction: it is 
to ‘make a small personal world’ [42]. Imagination, on the other hand, involves willingness to ‘see 
and take pleasure’ in what is precisely other than oneself. These themes recur, entwined, across 
Murdoch’s body of essays, for instance when she distinguishes between ‘obsessive, self-enclosing’ 
fantasy, and imagination, as ‘the ability to see the other thing, what one might call, to use those old-
fashioned words, nature, reality, the world’ [43]. 
 
Imagination, Fantasy and Techno-optimism 
Neither the findings of the natural sciences, nor the offerings of technology, as available now or as 
anticipated in the future, stand before us, as Murdoch put it, simply as ‘a world of “facts”’, but rather 
as ‘a world upon which our imagination has, at any given moment, already worked’ [44]. They are 
received by the active mediation of imagination, either honestly or fantastically, both at the level of 
the individual and of the wider culture. We might ask, then, what it would mean to react to proposed 
technological responses to climate change (including ones relating to patterns of demand for 
materials) in a mode of either imagination or fantasy. 
The most obvious example of the power of imagination and fantasy may be climate change denial. 
The findings of climate science, however objective they may be, clearly do not settle the matter for 
many. By some, certainly, these findings are received into their image of reality and come to inform 
it; for others they are not. Following Murdoch, we can call the human power to paint an internal 
picture of external reality imaginative if it is willing to be determined by what we encounter. In 
contrast, we can call fantastic if it tends to paint an internal representation of external reality 
according how one wishes that reality was. Climate change denial, on the judgement of the 
overwhelming majority of authorities in this field, would be an exercise in fantasy. It has a dream-
like quality, which aligns with another comment of Murdoch’s: 
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We are not isolated free choosers, monarchs of all we survey, but benighted creatures sunk in 
a reality whose nature we are constantly and overwhelmingly tempted to deform by fantasy. 
Our current picture of freedom encourages a dream-like facility; whereas what we require is a 
renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons 
[45]. 
To speak of those who deny human-driven climate change as ‘dreaming’ is obvious, but it may serve 
as too easy and comforting an example of imagination-become-fantasy in these matters. A dream-like 
attitude to reality is potentially just as much at play among those who take the reality of man-made 
climate change entirely seriously, but whose practical outlook is rendered quietist by a hope in future 
scientific and technological ‘fixes’ for those threats.  
Murdoch associated fantasy with dreaming. Earlier in the twentieth century, C. S. Lewis (1898-1963) 
similarly related daydreaming to moral achievement. In a letter written in 1930, he considered the 
danger of fantasising about doing the right thing, or about having done it, as too easily substituting 
for the action itself. 
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We read of spiritual efforts, and our imagination makes us believe that, because we enjoy the 
idea of doing them, we have done them. I am appalled to see how much of the change which I 
thought I had undergone lately was only imaginary. The real work seems still to be done. It is 
so fatally easy to confuse an aesthetic appreciation of the spiritual life with the life itself – to 
dream that you have walked, washed, and dressed, and then to find yourself still in bed [46].
10
 
Lewis noted the self-satisfaction that can belong to the fantasy of a daydream, and can provide a 
psychological reward without having undertaken the act for which the commendation would properly 
be due.
11
 This underlines the point that the well-intentioned person, indeed perhaps especially the 
person who is aware of the need to respond to climate change and is enthusiastic about technological 
developments in that area, may be especially prone to substitute the daydream for reality. Rather than 
moving us to action, ‘fantasising’ about some putative promised or envisaged capability for 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
 Lewis discusses the distinction between imagination as daydream or fantasy, and imagination as 
invention in Surprised by Joy [47], adding a third category (‘joy’), and which features prominently in 
that work. 
11
 Lewis’s attention to the deleterious effects of fantasising about doing good is unusual. Work on 
fantasy in ethics and moral psychology has typically concentrated on the effects of fantasising about 
harming others. For a consideration of the moral status of fantasing about wrongdoing, see Aaron 
Smuts [48], where he distinguishes ‘willful imagination or fantasy’, ‘guided imagination via 
representations: fiction, narrative, and pornography’, and ‘dreaming’ [49]. 
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mitigation can serve as a distraction from making the kinds of changes that are demanding and yet 
also within one’s power. Such changes would require significant shifts in patterns of behaviour, and 
this again distinguishes imagination from fantasy. Sociologists have labelled this phenomenon as one 
of techno-optimism. In the words of John Barry, it is the belief that technology will function today as 
the lance of Peleus functions in Greek myth, which could ‘heal the very wounds it inflicted’ [50]. 
This techno-optimist outlook may be as simple as taking ones bearings from all that is most hopeful 
in discussions of technological possibilities for mitigating climate change, while not paying equal 
attention to the less hopeful, or indeed simply most likely, trajectories that technology, politics and 
the economy might take.  
Characteristically, as defined here, the response of fantasy is to suppose that one can maintain the 
status quo: fantasy is a path of least resistance. Approached in this way, the prospect of a solution in 
the future will be taken as justification for a lack of change to behaviour now. It is to live according 
to the way we would like the world to be, with technological solutions delivering what we would 
want them to deliver, rather than according to how things currently are, and may well remain. We see 
here the tendency of fantasy to invest highly in the will: to imagine that the world is (or soon will be) 
malleable to human intention (as ‘monarchs of all we survey’ as we have read from Murdoch). In 
such ways, then, the dangers of fantastic thinking apply just as much to the well-meaning, green-
thinking person, as to someone who denies climate change altogether. 
 
Imagination, Fantasy and Agency 
Imagination and fantasy, then, are involved with action, and not only with perception. They therefore 
offer two different characterisations of what it means to act. To meet the world with imagination is to 
meet it in such a way as to be drawn on to engagement with it. Murdoch wrote on this territory in 
‘The Sovereignty of Good over other Concepts’: ‘We use our imagination not to escape the world but 
to join it, and this exhilarates us because of the distance between our ordinary dulled consciousness 
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[i.e. one operating according to fantasy] and an apprehension of the real’ [51]. In terms of 
involvement with the world, fantasy is associated with sloth and disengagement. It is important to 
appreciate, however, what this does not mean in relation to our topic. A ‘fantastic’, disengaged 
outlook does not correspond to a reduction of human action – or of producing and polluting – but to a 
lack of attention to the setting and consequences of those actions, and to a corresponding lack of self-
criticism.  
Fantasy tends to project and paper over, while imagination receives and responds. For Kant, as for 
Coleridge, as we have seen, a capacity to survey and integrate is central to the power of imagination. 
It relates, for instance, to the ability to envisage what is before us as an integrated entity, say as a 
book and not simply as smudges of colour, and as a whole that exceeds what I can take in at any 
moment, for instance in apprehending the book not only in terms of the cover and sides that I can see, 
but as also having a back and other sides, which I cannot. More generally, imagination is integrative 
in the sense of conceiving of one’s actions within the web of a greater whole, while the impulse of 
fantasy is to view them as isolated and cut off. Imagination understands perceptions and actions in 
terms of their connection to a whole, while fantasy does not. 
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One way into this relation of imagination or fantasy with divergent forms of agency is to consider 
them in terms of associated forms of creativity and freedom. As a start, drawing on Murdoch, as we 
have seen, an exercise of creativity and freedom characterised by fantasy will tend to take the form of 
an imposition of the will upon what is external to us. In contrast, an imaginative exercise of creative 
freedom will be cognisant, even respectful, of the material with which it works. Approaching this in 
terms of an ‘artistic’ sense of imagination, the exercise of freedom encountered there, with its 
genuine spark of novelty, typically sits alongside a simultaneous attention to the ‘material’ with 
which one is working, whether we interpret ‘material’ in terms of stone and the chisel, or words and 
grammar, or in the sense of working with the ‘material’ of the tradition that one has inherited [52] 
[53]. Imaginative creativity is deeply attentive, for all it is also concerned with creating that which is 
new.
12
 In a more general sense, as we have seen, (relating to the primary imagination, as common to 
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 Murdoch discusses this briefly, writing both that ‘This sense of distance and otherness belongs to 
the good artist as it belongs to the religious man… Imagination is a kind of freedom, a renewed 
ability to perceive and express the truth’ [54] and that ‘Freedom is not strictly the exercise of the will, 
but rather the experience of accurate vision which, when this becomes appropriate, occasions action’ 
[55]. 
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all human perception, thought and action), to proceed with imagination rather than fantasy is to 
attend to, think through, and act in terms of, what is real, rather than what one might wish were real. 
To perceive, think and act imaginatively, rather than fantastically, is therefore both to let what lies 
beyond the ego make a greater claim upon oneself, and to offer that reality something more creatively 
transformatory in return: it is to be simultaneously both more faithful to reality as it currently stands, 
whether we like that or not, and more able to transcend the status quo. Crucially for our purposes, the 
ability to take a step back, to assess, and consequently to change or stop, belongs more to imagination 
than to fantasy.  
Action that is driven by fantasy, which carries on relentlessly because the mind absorbed in fantasy 
does nothing to check it, is obviously active and yet in another sense it is peculiarly passive. Fantasy 
may be characterised by a certain disengagement, but our problem is not, in fact, that we live lives of 
calm and restful retreat from action, or even lives of indolent lack of activity – would, in a sense, for 
the good of the planet, that we did – but rather that we are incessantly building, consuming, 
travelling, and so on. A fantasising outlook is frequently today one of living frantically but without 
attention. In contrast, it falls within the domain of true imagination to be capable of a form of 
restraint that is nonetheless strikingly inceptive, for all it is a stepping back from action.  
A passage of Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) throws light on this. Arendt was a Jewish philosopher born 
in Germany, who spent much of her immensely productive writing life in the United States of 
America. In her treatment of forgiveness and agency in The Human Condition (published in 1958), 
she contrasts forgiveness with revenge, and in this we see something profoundly similar to the 
distinction between the passive activity of fantasy and the potentially active restraint of the 
imagination: 
vengeance… acts in the form of re-acting against an original trespassing, whereby far from 
putting an end to the consequences of the first misdeed, everybody remains bound to the 
process, permitting the chain reaction contained in every action to take its unhindered course. 
In contrast to revenge, which is the natural, automatic reaction to transgression and which 
because of the irreversibility of the action process can be expected and even calculated, the 
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act of forgiving can never be predicted; it is the only reaction that acts in an unexpected way 
and thus retains, through being a reaction, something of the original character of action. 
Forgiving, in other words, is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and 
unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its 
consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven [56]. 
Vengeance, Arendt comments, would seem to be supremely active, and it is taken as such by those 
who inhabit its ‘macho’ ambit. However, as an action it is always a ‘re-action’ and, as such, it 
‘remains bound to the process’ to which it belongs. In contrast, although forgiveness is a form of 
cessation, it always possesses ‘something of the original character of action’. Consequently, 
forgiveness (which refrains from carrying out the act of revenge) requires and exhibits an even higher 
pitch of agency than does revenge, for all such revenge issues in an act – a violent act in some sense 
– while forgiveness forgoes that action.  
The parallels with imagination and fantasy are not difficult to see. Imaginative agency has something 
of the same character of novelty and creativity – of the irruption of the new – which is so clearly seen 
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in the person who forgives.
13
 The rut of fantasy, like revenge, is characterised by an action is robbed 
of its agency, while imagination, like forgiveness, is characterised by an agency capable of 
restraining action. Similarly, people fantasise about revenge, while forgiveness requires a form of 
moral imagination.  
Considered in terms of forms of agency, the company, the CEO, the architect, who builds a 
skyscraper ten stories higher than the previous local record may be engaged in a Herculean labour, 
but in another sense (as opened up by Arendt’s analysis), such labour is not as creative, or as much 
characterised by agency, as that of the person who is able to think beyond the deeply-worn groove of 
the pursuit of tallness. The acts most characterised by agency today, in view of impending climatic 
disaster, would be those characterised by restraint, for instance by simplicity, and the innovativeness 
that could take us beyond a paradigm of ‘more is better’, or the use of the same materials, in the same 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
 When Arendt writes that ‘the act of forgiving can never be predicted’ we might want to add a 
caveat, in that forgiveness need not have a ‘from nowhere’ quality: it need not spring from 
unconditioned will and, indeed, is not likely to do so. The note of radical newness that comes with 
forgiveness is radical also in the sense of being ‘rooted’ in a life and character that can properly be 
said to have prepared for it. The act of forgiveness cannot be ‘predicted’ in the sense that it remains 
unnecessitated and free, but it is typically ‘fitting’ to the person from whom it comes, not random. 
Here, moral freedom is akin to the freedom of the trained artist: perhaps a dancer for instance, who 
can dance freely because of, and not in spite of, arduous preparation. 
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way as before, only in larger quantities. This requires agency guided by the imagination, both in the 
sense of the capacity for the new, and in the sense of a willingness to let the reality of things bear 
upon us – to let it form its image within us – rather than to remain in the cocooned internality of 
fantasy, be it ever so busy in its ‘productivity’.  
 
The Significance of Artistic Imagination  
Across Murdoch’s various discussions of the themes we have considered, a broadly artistic frame of 
reference is usually in play. As herself a prolific and successful writer of fiction, her concern was 
frequently with imagination and fantasy as they operate in the labours of the novelist, expressed in 
what he or she produces. Nonetheless, over and beyond that literary background, Murdoch saw the 
capacity for imagination and fantasy as fundamental parts of the human makeup. While, for instance, 
she could write about ‘creative imagination and obsessive fantasy’ as ‘very close almost 
indistinguishable forces in the mind of the writer’ (who must, therefore, always ‘play with fire’) [57], 
in other discussions she clearly saw these two tendencies at play in all human dealings with the 
world. Indeed, one of the reasons that she though that it matters what sort of imaginative (or 
fantastical) literature someone reads is its influence on his or her all-pervasive imaginative 
engagement with the world the rest of the time. As she put it, if the ‘quality of consciousness matters, 
then anything which alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity and realism is 
to be connected with virtue’ [58]. Imagination involves attention to other people (and other places, 
cultures and outlooks) in their genuine otherness, while fantasy works so as to assimilate them to 
ourselves and our own purposes.  
I think good art is good for people precisely because it is not fantasy but imagination. It 
breaks the grip of our own dull fantasy life and stirs us to the effort to true vision. Most of the 
time we fail to see the big wide real world at all because we are blinded by obsession, anxiety, 
envy, resentment, fear. We make a small personal world in which we remain enclosed. Great 
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art is liberating, it enables us to see and take pleasure in what is not ourselves. Literature stirs 
and satisfies our curiosity, it interests us in other people and other scenes, and helps us to be 
tolerant and generous [59].  
The artistic products of imagination are significant, therefore, and not least for their power to educate 
the clear-sighted operation of outward-turned imagination, over inward-turned fantasy. Fiction can 
open the reader to other points of view, not simply in the sense of furnishing new ideas to consider, 
but also in the sense of educating us that other people are genuinely other, and occupy alternative 
vantage points. As Martha Nussbaum has written, even something as basic as being a competent and 
decent citizen requires the ‘narrative imagination’ to be able ‘to think what it might be like to be in 
the shoes of a person different from oneself’ [60]. This has traditionally been fostered through 
literary fiction and other forms of storytelling, as an integral part of education [61]. 
This is primarily a philosophical essay, and it is not the purpose of this paper to explore the role that 
works of creative imagination might play in relation to climate change and material demand 
reduction. That there is a role for them, however, is clear, since simply presenting the facts of the 
case has clearly not been enough to win thoroughgoing assent: not, for instance, in the United States 
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[62].
14
 One response would be to use imaginative forms to present an anticipated vision of the 
potentially cataclysmic results of further climate change, as seen in the sub-genre of ‘climate change 
fiction’, which is often apocalyptic in tone [64]. There is an argument to be made, however, that the 
human will is better stirred to radical change by positive attraction than by negative aversion. Such a 
proposition lies behind Augustine of Hippo’s provocatively framed moral injunction of Dilige, et 
quod vis fac: ‘love [rightly], and do what you will’ [65]. Changes of behaviour, on this view, stem 
more fundamentally from a reorientation of what one loves or esteems, rather than from a string of 
commands or threats. The challenges is to find ways to present alternative ways of living (not least in 
terms of material consumption), with lower impact on the climate, as genuinely attractive, rather than 
simply as a bitter pill to swallow.  
 
Conclusion 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14
 In a recent study, James Painter described reluctance to attribute climate change to human actions 
as ‘predominately an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon’ [63]. 
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Scientific and technological responses to climate change are by no means deserving of dismissal: far 
from it. They are, however, only part of the solution, and they can be received as much in a spirit of 
fantasy as of imagination. Fantasy would seize upon them as a ‘magic bullet’, lying just around the 
corner, absolving us from the sort of action now that would require a substantial change of life, not 
least in the form of restraint. That, as we have seen, demands imagination. 
The need to engage the imagination when it comes to mitigating climate change faces us as a 
challenge. Widespread shifts in patterns of behaviour, for instance in patterns of consumption, will 
only follow if the imagination is won over. This is a challenge – indeed a difficult challenge – and yet 
the role of the imagination here is at the same time an opportunity. We might recall three aspects of 
imagination which this paper has considered: that to respond to the world imaginatively is to be open 
to reality around us, that the imagination tends towards action, and that we are talking here about a 
fundamentally integrative faculty, able to consider matters as a whole. Fantasy might shy away from 
such dispositions, but there is also reason to suppose that embracing them makes for human 
fulfilment. In this sense, whatever the resistance we might find in the tendency towards fantasy, 
behaving imaginatively is ultimately more rewarding. 
The work of writers such as Matthew Crawford [66] and Kate Fletcher [67] [68], who has contributed 
to this number of Philosophical Transactions A, attests to the satisfaction that people find in what the 
former calls ‘working with your hands’ and the latter ‘the craft of use’. Theirs is a vision of a 
regained proficiency in dealing with the objects and materials that support our lives, and of their 
repair and reuse. It is imaginative in each of the senses just mentioned: it pays attention, it involves 
agency, and it is fundamentally integrative. This local dimension, worked out at the level of 
individual households, is not the only level where imagination is called for. Properly imaginative 
responses, in the sense described here, are needed at national and international levels, and in the 
corresponding democratic decisions of the populous who endorse or reject particular parties and their 
platforms. It is, however, at the level of the individual and household that people can take what the 
scientist and the engineer is saying, quite literally, into their own hands. Far from delegating 
responsibility for dealing with climate change to engineers, the perspective that Crawford and 
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Fletcher advocate seeks to appropriate a little of the engineers’ ingenuity for the population more 
widely. This offers what the quotation from Augustine above suggested we need: a vision that is 
genuinely attractive, and not simply a burden or a duty. It is attractive because it calls for 
imagination, since the exercise of imagination, in the broad sense described in this paper, is so 
integral to what it means to be human. 
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